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Claude Lopez1 and Elham Saeidinezhad 
 The Dodd-Frank Act was the most far-reaching financial regulatory reform in the U.S. since the nation 
emerged from the Great Depression in the 1930s. The act aims to limit systemic risk, allow for the safe 
resolution of the largest intermediaries, submit risky nonbanks to greater scrutiny, and reform 
derivative trading. 
Nearly six years after the birth of the act, significant progress can be observed. However, the act itself 
remains highly controversial. With many of the bill’s original supporters in Congress no longer in office 
and the urgency of the 2008 crisis fading from the public memory, the implementation of the remaining 
parts appears challenging as shown by the Congress ‘roll-back of the “swaps push-out” rule and the 
recent federal court ruling against designating MetLife as a systemically important financial institution 
(SIFI). Furthermore, the weaker coordination among regulators combined to the forthcoming 
presidential election may trigger a change in regulatory regime, moving away from crises-driven policy. 
The public debate is often highly politicized and opinionated when it comes to Dodd-Frank. With that in 
mind, this paper seeks to assess Dodd-Frank implementation with respect to its initial goal of building “a 
safer, more stable financial system,” where proprietary trading and the business of banking are 
separated, and where taxpayers and small business will not have to bail out failing large financial 
firms.”2 To make the assessment, the paper first establishes a timeline summarizing the Dodd-Frank 
final-rule milestones and then compares their implementation to the initial goals.  
                                                           
1 Corresponding author:clopez@milkeninstitute.org 
2Based on  https://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform 
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Milestone Timeline  
The Dodd-Frank Act emphasizes macroprudential policy as an important component of financial 
regulation.3 Monitoring systemically important institutions, markets or activities is at its core. The act 
aims specifically at developing tools to (1) identify SIFIs, (2) monitor their resilience under stress and 
adjust the level of capital, liquidity, or leverage if deemed necessary, and (3) to facilitate their orderly 
liquidation in the case of failure while minimizing the impact to the overall economy. Figures 1 and 2 
summarize the main final rules passed since 2010 for banks and nonbanks, respectively. Table 1 
provides more detail regarding the goals and implementation of the rules. 
2010-2011 
The first step of Dodd-Frank implementation in 2010 was to reform the existing regulatory framework 
toward a more transparent and harmonized system by creating the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) and the Office of Financial Research (OFR). These institutions’ aim is to enhance financial stability 
by mitigating “systemic risk.” Their key objective has been to alleviate the so-called “too-big-to-fail” 
phenomenon by designating and monitoring SIFIs under the leadership of the Federal Reserve (Fed).  
The SIFIs framework first was applied to the banking sector. Since 2011, in an effort to move toward a 
better capitalized, more liquid, and more securely funded banking industry, SIFI-designated banks have 
been required to observe higher capital surcharges, lower leverage and higher liquidity requirements. 
They also must pass a tougher yearly stress test by the Fed.4 Rules related to prudential requirements 
were finalized between 2011 and 2015 and have been implemented. In contrast, the resolution plan 
requirements, finalized in 2011, are still a work in progress. As of June 2016, the “living will” of only one 
bank, Citigroup, has been deemed credible by the Fed and FDIC in allowing for an orderly liquidation in 
case of failure.5   
2012-2013 
                                                           
3 See Lopez et al. (2015 a), and (2015 b) for more details on macroprudential policy. 
4 The Federal Reserve will stress test 33 large banks in 2016. These test are binding for SIFIs denominated banks. 
5 Neither agency found Citigroup’s resolution plan as “not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution” under bankruptcy laws, but 
they did find shortcomings for the bank to fix. 
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In 2012 and 2013, the FSOC added major financial market utilities (FMU) and insurance companies to 
the SIFI list.6 By creating this category, regulators emphasized the importance of market infrastructures 
that support multilateral payments as well as clearing and settlement activities. FMUs serve a critical 
role in supporting financial stability by reducing risk for their participants and counterparts. This role 
became increasingly important after the finalization of the Derivative Clearing Organization (DCO) rule in 
2011. By requiring standardized derivatives transactions to be centrally cleared, the rule has 
strengthened the role of central clearing counterparties or clearing houses (one type of FMU), 
enhancing the amount of risk (credit, liquidity, and operational risk) held by each one. As a result, two 
clearing houses have been designated systemically important derivatives clearing houses (SIDCOs). 
Regulators further tightened the prudential standards by introducing “Enhanced Risk Management 
Standards” for SIDCOs in 2013. 
In 2013, Dodd-Frank -driven regulations expanded to banks’ activities in an effort to remove activities 
which played a major role in the global financial crisis, namely securitization activities and derivatives 
dealing. Prior to the crisis, most of these activities were off banks’ balance sheets, and they remained 
mainly outside of the regulatory radar until the Fed had to backstop the system. Among the several 
changes that have been made, two appear particularly important. The swaps push-out rule, introduced 
in 2013 and amended the following year, is the first main change regarding securitization. It prohibits 
banks from dealing with swaps on an asset-backed security (or a group or index primarily comprised of 
such securities). The Volcker rule, focused on derivative dealing, separates proprietary trading from the 
actual market making, prohibiting banks to participate in proprietary trading. 
2014-Present 
Moving forward with their investigation of systemic markets, regulators focused on the money market 
funds due to their important role to “investors who use them as a cash management vehicle and to the 
corporations, financial institutions, municipalities and others that use them as a source of short-term 
funding.” (Champ, 2013). The new rules, finalized in 2014, require institutional prime and institutional 
municipal money market mutual funds to price and transact at a “floating” net asset value (NAV), permit 
certain money market mutual funds to charge liquidity fees, and allow the use of redemption gates to 
                                                           
6 In developing these risk management standards, the U.S. supervisory agencies have been working with other global supervisors through the 
Basel Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), with a 
goal of global operating principles. These international efforts have resulted in two CPSS-IOSCO publications. The risk management standards 
adopted by the Federal Reserve and SEC and proposed by the CFTC are generally based on the international standards of the Principles for 
Financial Market Infrastructures. 
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temporarily halt withdrawals during periods of stress.7 The reform is an attempt to reduce investor runs 
and limit liquidity in time of stress. 
Finally, a series of swap-related rules for nonbanks have been finalized since the Swap Push-Out rule. 
The goal is to increase the transparency of derivatives markets, enhance capital and margin 
requirements, and monitor cross-border activity.  
Comparison of Ambition and Achievements 
As discussed above, the macroprudential policy driven by the Dodd-Frank Act focused primarily on 
monitoring systemically important institutions, markets or activities. Conceptually, for this framework to 
be successful at mitigating systemic risk, the three required steps (identification, prudential 
enhancement, and resolution plans) must be respected, and must be adapted and applied to any 
financial intermediary, activity or market that could pose a threat to U.S financial stability.  
Table 1 contrasts Dodd-Frank goals with the rules finalized as of June 2016. A few facts stand out: 
• SIFIs framework:  Only the first phase, identification, has been applied to institutions other than 
banks in the U.S. However, one institution, insurance provider Metlife, successfully challenged 
its designation as systemically important earlier this year.8 Only one out of eight U.S. banks 
identified as SIFIs as of June 2016 had submitted a living will deemed acceptable by the Fed and 
the FDIC. In other words, only Citibank has completed the three steps necessary for the 
framework to work at the institution level. Interestingly, other finalized rules, such as the one 
calling for the Derivatives Clearing Organization, led to the creation of more nonbank SIFIs, 
while the methodology on how to implement steps 2 (prudential enhancement) and 3 
(resolution plans) is still a work in progress.  
• Derivatives dealing and security activities: Regulations remain a work in progress, with a third 
of the rulings still to come. Meanwhile, the scope of the Swaps Push-Out rule was significantly 
narrowed in its 2014 amended version and the full implementation of the Volcker rule has 
been delayed to 2017. 
• Financial stability and systemic risk monitoring: Enhanced prudential rules are designed for SIFIs 
but so far have been finalized for both SIFI-designated banks and FMUs. As of June 2016, the 
                                                           
7 Berkowitz (2015) 
8 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Decision, Case 1:15-cv-00045-RMC Document 106 Filed 03/30/16. 
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Fed has invited comments regarding proposed rules for SIFI-designated insurance companies. 
The money market fund rule is the only major regulatory development concerning asset 
management industry.  
• Consumer and investor protection:  Most of the rules enhancing transparency developed by the 
SEC also enhance investor protection, which is part of the SEC mandate. The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was created in 2011 to promote consumer protection, but 
questions regarding its lack of oversight and accountability have been raised. Among the 
concerns: CFPB is not required to follow Office of Management and Budget guidelines, rules 
and regulations and is exempt from congressional or executive oversight.9 
Overall, while significant improvements have been achieved in terms of transparency, data sharing and 
the resilience of the banking sector, Dodd-Frank implementation appears fragmented. It is a work in 
progress when compared to its initial goal of “building a safer, more stable financial system” while also 
ending taxpayers’ bailout of the system. Furthermore, we consider that such goals cannot be reached 
unless issues related to regulatory consolidation, government-sponsored enterprises, regulation per 
function and resolution process are addressed. 
 
Regulatory consolidation: Very little has been done to streamline the regulatory structure, which 
remains a mix of federal agencies with overlapping authority and mandates that do not automatically 
converge.10 The FSOC was created to enhance coordination across these agencies, yet the most 
successful area of regulation, the banking system, is the industry that had a clear regulatory leader, the 
Fed, prior to the FSOC existence. The insurance industry is another illustration of a failed consolidation. 
The Federal Insurance Office was created to monitor the industry, yet with the exception of the SIFI-
designated insurers, insurance companies continue to be regulated, supervised, and guaranteed at the 
state level. Regulatory coordination should also go beyond the Dodd-Frank mandate and FSOC’s 
member agencies to properly assess the impact that the different layers of regulations, as well as their 
interaction, have on their targets. (For example, Dodd-Frank and Know Your Customer, or the fiduciary 
rule finalized by the Department of Labor may not be coherent with the one the SEC intends to propose 
next spring). 
 
                                                           
9 Schultz(2014) 
10 See Volcker Alliance report (2015) “A multitude of federal agencies, self-regulatory organizations (SROs), and state authorities share 
oversight of the financial system under a framework riddled with regulatory gaps, loopholes, and inefficiencies. […] failure to reorganize the 
regulatory structure will contribute to the buildup of systemic risk.” 
6 | P a g e  
 
Government-sponsored enterprises (GSE): Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac accounted for the largest losses 
imposed on taxpayers during the financial crisis, estimated at $291 billion, or more than 5 percent of 
their mortgage portfolios at the end of 2009.11 Yet, no regulatory changes are observed. In recent years, 
nearly 80 percent of new mortgages have been backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and other 
government agencies (such as the Federal Housing Administration). 
 
Regulation by function: Nonbanks perform functions like banks while having other legal forms, yet the 
financial crisis of 2007–09 showed that much of the wholesale banking system—investment banks 
through repos, money market funds, and asset-backed commercial paper conduits in particular—
experienced runs and eventually were bailed out.12 Difficulties encountered in implementing fully and 
adapting the current SIFIs framework across the different main actors of the financial system (asset 
managers, insurance companies, etc.) show that it will leave regulatory gaps that may create regulatory 
arbitrage at the cost of creating systemic risk. An alternative would be to impose similar regulations for 
institutions performing the similar tasks (for example, depository institutions and money-market funds) 
and to have requirements consistently set across markets and institutions. (If the risk of the underlying 
loans is the same, it should not matter how those loans are sliced and diced through securitization in 
terms of determining the required capital buffer of banking institutions).  
 
Resolution process for SIFIs: The motivation behind Dodd-Frank was to enhance financial stability and 
eliminate the need for a government agency to intervene using taxpayers’ money to backstop the 
market. The resolution process, or Step 3 in the SIFIs’ framework, is supposed to address this point by 
ultimately requiring other SIFIs—and not the taxpayers—to bear the cost if one fails. In practice, 
however, this will work if only a single failure occurs at any given time. A problem, of course, arises 
during a systemic event when there might be multiple exposure failures (FMUs) or insolvencies (banks 
and insurance companies). An alternative framework would be to promote proper incentives and make 
restructuring workable in a crisis instead of focusing on the procedures for liquidation in the case of 
insolvency. The focus should be on automatic recapitalization that does not depend on public 
assistance.13  
                                                           
11 Congressional Budget Office Testimony (2011). 
12 Acharya and Richardson (2012). 
13 Ceccheti and Schoenholtz (2014) and (2015). 
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Finally, while a plan to revamp Dodd-Frank—the Financial Choice Act—has been introduced in Congress, 
regulators must keep in mind that financial stability does not depend solely on financial and prudential 
regulations. Low real interest rates helped foster increased leverage across financial institutions, 
corporations, households, and markets. A high degree of leverage limits the ability of borrowers and the 
financial system to absorb shocks, leading to a quick erosion of capital buffers and a rapid decline in 
confidence. In other words, financial and prudential regulations should complement proper 
macroeconomic policies (monetary, fiscal, structural) and require international coordination.  
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Figure 1 Bank's Dodd-Frank Final Rules, Milestones 
 source: authors 
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Figure 2 Non-Bank's Dodd-Frank Final Rules, Milestones 
Source: Authors 
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Table 1: Rules' goals and implementation 
SIFIs       
Goal 
Institutions, activities and markets that have been deemed so important to the functioning of the economy 
that special rules and buffers were put in place to  (1) reduce the probability of failure and (2) minimize 
spillovers in case of failure. Any firm designated a SIFI is subject to stricter oversight from the Federal 
Reserve, including taking stress tests, writing bankruptcy plans known as living wills, and meeting stricter 
capital requirements. 
Category Rules Targeted Outcome 
Implementation (as of 
June 2016) 
Milestones  Identification  
Any financial intermediary that could pose a threat to U.S. 
financial stability, based on the  size, interconnectedness, 
cross-jurisdictional activity, complexity and non-
substitutability, or mix of its activities 
Banks, insurance 
companies and FMU. 
Successful Metlife's 
challenge in 2014 
 
   Stress tests 
Assess an institution capital plan and ability to  continue 
providing financial services, without government 
assistance, following a specified shock 
Only for banks 
  
 Resolution plans 
or living wills 
Plan on how a SIFI would resolve itself if it failed. Based on 
that knowledge and in case of failure, the government 
would use Orderly Liquidation Authority to dismantle the 
firm so its losses would not affect others. 
Only 1 bank 
  
Money market 
fund rules 
Stress testing, disclosure, floating NAV, liquidity fee and 
redemption gate 
Conformance period ends 
on Oct. 14, 2016 
    
Derivatives Dealing/ Securitization Activities  
Goal 
Minimize systemic risk of derivatives trading, create transparency in derivatives markets, prohibit entities 
holding customer deposits from engaging in speculative derivatives activity  
Category Rules Targeted Outcome 
Implementation (as of 
June 2016) 
Milestones Volker Rule 
Prohibit entities holding customer deposits from engaging 
in speculative derivatives activity  
Conformance period 
extended to July 21, 2017  
  
Derivatives 
Clearing 
Organization 
Rule 
Standardized derivatives transactions must be centrally 
cleared 
Effective in January 9, 
2012. In July 7 2012, 2 
DCOs are denominated  
Systemically Important 
FMU 
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Swaps related 
rules for bank 
and nonbanks 
Enhanced regulations and increased transparency of 
derivatives markets regarding trade reporting,  capital and 
margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives, 
exchange of electronic platform, crossborder activities 
Work in progress, with 
1/3 remaining* 
Financial Stability and Systemic Risk monitoring   
Goal Enhance the stability, resilience and transparency of the US financial system    
Category Rules Targeted Outcome 
Implementation (as of 
June 2016) 
        
Milestones 
Enhanced 
Prudential Rules 
(liquidity, capital, 
leverage, 
concentration 
limits, risk 
management...) 
Enhance the stability and resilience of SIFIs 
Focus on banks, FMUs 
and money market funds 
        
  
Transparency 
and 
harmonization 
Simplify the US financial regulatory system  FSOC, OFR 
    
  Consumer and Investor Protection 
Goal  Devoted to measures specifically intended to protect consumers and investors  
Category Rules Targeted Outcome 
Implementation (as of 
June 2016) 
        
Milestones 
Investment 
Adviser 
Registration  
To protect pensioners; requirement to publicly available 
the data, even for exempt advisers, in order to increase 
transparency and access for prospective investors 
 Pension consultants now 
need to register with SEC 
  
Consumer 
Financial 
Protection 
Bureau  
created to promote clear information for consumers and 
protect them from unfair practices; promote fair, efficient 
and innovative financial services for consumers; improve 
access to financial services.  
 
 Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act 
        
Source: Authors 
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Glossary 
ABS: Asset-backed securities, called ABS, are bonds or notes backed by financial assets.  
CCAR: Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review is an annual exercise by the Federal Reserve to assess 
whether the largest bank holding companies operating in the United States. 
CFPB: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is a government agency created after the 2008 financial 
crisis to protect consumers. 
DCO: A Derivatives Clearing Organization is a clearinghouse for the settlement or netting of derivative 
obligations; or otherwise provides clearing services that mutualize or transfer credit risk among 
participants. 
ESMA: The European Securities and Markets Authority’s main mission is to contribute to safeguarding 
the stability of the European Union's financial system. 
ETFs: An Exchange-Traded Fund is an investment fund traded on stock exchanges, much like stocks. An 
ETF combines the valuation feature of a mutual fund or unit investment trust, which can be bought or 
sold at the end of each trading day for its net asset value. 
FIO: The Treasury's Federal Insurance Office mission is to provide necessary expertise and advice 
regarding insurance matters to the Treasury Department and other federal agencies.   
FMU: Financial market utilities are multilateral systems that provide the infrastructure for transferring, 
clearing, and settling payments, securities, and other financial transactions. 
FSOC:  The Financial Stability Oversight Council’s mission is to provide comprehensive monitoring of the 
stability of US financial system. 
G-SIBs: A Global Systemically Important Banks is defined as a financial institution whose distress or 
disorderly failure would cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity. 
GSE: A government-sponsored enterprise is a financial services corporation created by the United States 
Congress. 
MMF: Money Market Mutual Fund. 
OFR: The Office of Financial Research’s main mission is to deliver high-quality financial data, standards 
and analysis for the Council and public. 
SEC: The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission holds primary responsibility for enforcing the federal 
securities laws, proposing securities rules, and regulating the securities industry. 
SIDCO: Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations. 
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SIFIs: A Systemically Important Financial Institution is a financial company whose material financial 
distress—or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of its activities—
could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability. 
SIFMU: Systemically important financial market utilities. 
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